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[L. A. No. 26266. In Bank. Aug. 28, 1961.] 
S. D. CAPLAN et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. KEN-
NETH O. SCHROEDER et al, Defendants and Ap-
. pellants. 
[1] Vendor and Purchaser- Oonstruction and Operation of Oon-
tract.-Where plaintiffs, pursuant to an agreement to buy land 
owned by defendants, delivered their promissory note outside 
escrow, and the parties agreed that an escrow should be opened, 
that plaintiffs would pay an additional sum in cash, assume 
existing notes secured by trust deeds and execute a note se-
cured by a new trust deed for the balance, and where plain-
titIs paid the note when due but refused to complete the pur-
chase and defendants terminated the escrow, plaintiffs entered 
into a mutually binding contract that could be specifically 
enforced against them and they executed and paid the note in 
part performance of that contract. Under these circumstances 
a mere recitation in the contract that, if the sale was not con-
summated by reason of some default of the buyers, the note 
or moneys received in payment should be retained by the sellers 
as agreed consideration for the agreement was insufficient to 
establish "meaningful separate consideration," since defend-
ants executed the contract, not in exchange for the note and 
its payment alone, but in consideration of plaintiffs' agreement 
to purchase the property on all the terms stated. 
[2] ld.-Forfeiture of Purchaser's lnterest.-Where it is only be-
cause of the purchasers' default in completing the purchase 
under a contraet to buy realty that the vendors are given the 
right to retain payments made on a promissory note executed 
by the purchasers, a provision giving that right is one "by 
which the amount of damage to be paid, or other compensation 
to be made, for a brench of an obligation, is determined in 
anticipation thereof" (Civ. Code, § 1670), and it is therefore 
void unless it falls within the exception, stated in Civ. Code, 
§ 1671, of impracticability or extreme difficulty in fixing the 
actual damage. 
[3] ld.-Recovery by Purchaser of Payments or Deposits.-Even 
a willfully default.ing vendee may recover the excess of his 
part pnYIIll'nts ove:>r the:> damages caused by his breach. 
[1] See Oal.J'ur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, § 7 et seq.; Am.J'ur., 
Vendor and Purchaser, § 5 et seq. 
McX. Dig. References: [1] Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 97, 101; 
[2] Vendor and Purchaser, § 127; [3, 7] Vendor and Purchaser, 
§ 334; [4-6] DIlUlages, § 133; [8] Dallluges, § 38. 
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[4] Da.mages-Liquidated Damages-ILeal Estate Transactions.-
A provision for retention of a reasonable down payment as 
liquidated damages in a contract for the sale of real property 
is presumptively valid. 
[6] leL - Liquidated Damages -Real Estate Transactions. - The 
evidence did not establish as a matter of law that a provision 
for retention of a promissory note executed by purchasers of 
realty was for liquidated damages where, though the labels 
adopted by the parties were not conclusive, the parties provided 
for liquidated damages in the event of a breach by the vendors 
but did not 80 describe the right to retain the note in the event 
of a breach by the purchasers, nor provide that the retention 
and collection of the note should be the exclusive remedy in 
damages against them. 
[6] Id.-Liquidated Damages-Real Estate Transactions.-Though 
the amount of a promissory note executed by the purchasers 
under a realty contract was less than 5 per cent of the pur-
chase price and there was evidence that, at the time the con-
tract was made, "it would be impracticable or extremely dim-
eult to fix the actual damage" (Civ. Code, § 1671), where there 
was other evidence that the value of the land was expected to 
increase with the passage of time and it might be inferred 
that the parties did not contemplate that the vendors would 
suffer any damage if they were subsequently required to resell 
their property and that the amount of the note did not repre-
sent a reasonable endeavor to estimate probable damages in 
the event of the purchasers' breach, whether the parties in-
tended the provision for retention of the note to be for liqui-
dated damages to the exclusion of the damages that would 
otherwise be recoverable and, if so, whether the requirements 
of Civ. Code, § 1671, were met, were questions of fact that it 
was incumbent on the vendors to present to the trial court 
for resolution. 
[7] Vendor and Purchaser-Recovery by Purchaser of Payments 
or Deposits-Deduetions.-Defaulting purchasers who were en-
titled under a realty contract to the amount paid by them on 
a promissory note could not complain that, since the vendors 
resold the property without the assistance of a broker, the 
vendors were saved the expense of a second broker's fee and 
should not be allowed to deduct the broker's fee for the first 
sale from the amount paid by the purchasers on the note, 
since the vendors, not the purchasers, were entitled to the 
benefit of any savings the vendors e1Iected by reselling their 
property without the assistance of a broker. 
[4] See Oal.Jur.2d, Damages, § 212; Am.Jur., Damages, §§ 258, 
260. 
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[8] Damages-Interest.-In an action to recover money paid, plus 
damages, under a contract to buy real property, where the 
value of the property on which the extent of damages depended 
was not certain and could not be made certain by calculation, 
interest did not become payable until the parties stipulated to 
that value after the action was commenced, and the court erred, 
not in failing to award interest from the date the escrow was 
closed, but in awarding it from the date the action was brought. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Orange County. Raymond Thompson, Judge. Modified and 
affirmed. 
Action to recover money paid, plus damages, under a con-
tract to buy real property. Judgment for plaintiffs for 
amount paid, less certain expenses incurred by defendants, 
modified and affirmed. 
LE'on J. Alexander and Alexander, Inman & Fine for Plain-
tiffs and Appellants. 
Carl C. Cowles, Rimel & Johnston and Fred D. Johnston 
for Defendants and Appellants. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On July 12,1955, plaintiffs agreed to buy 
and defendants agreed to sell approximately 147 acres of land 
in Orange County for $2,200 an acre or approximately 
$323,000. Pursuant to the contract plaintiffs delivered to de-
fendants outside of escrow their promissory note for $15,000, 
payable with interest in two equal installments due in three 
months and six months from the date of the agreement. The 
parties agreed that an escrow should be opened within ten 
days and closed within six months and that plaintiffs would 
pay an additional $85,000 in cash, assume existing notes 
secured by deeds of trust for approximately $80,000, and 
execute a note secured by a new deed of trust for the balance. 
Plaintiffs paid the $15,000 note with interest when due but 
refused to complete the purchase, and defendants terminated 
the escrow. Within the following year defendants sold the 
property to others at a somewhat higher price than they had 
agreed to sell it to plaintiffs. 
In January 1958 plaintiffs brought this action to recover 
the amount they had paid plus damages, alleging that defend-
ants had brcached the contract. In the event that the court 
should find that plaintiffs breached the contract, they sought 
) 
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restitution of the amount paid less any damages suffered by 
defendants. Before trial it was stipulated that plaintiffs will-
fully breached the contract and that at all material times the 
value of the property was equal to the contract price of 
$2,200 per acre. The trial court concluded that plaintiffs were 
entitled to restitution of the amount paid less certain expenses 
incurred by defendants and entered judgment for the differ-
ence of $13,032.75 plus interests and costs. Both plaintiffs and 
defendants appeal. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in allowing de-
fendants a deduction for the broker's fee paid by them and 
in awarding interest from the date the action was brought 
instead of from the date the escrow was terminated. Defend-
ants contend that the trial court erred in holding invalid the 
contract provision permitting them to retain the amount paid. 
The contract provided that plaintiffs" as BUYERS will make, 
execute and deliver to the SELLERS their promissory note for 
Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) payable Seven Thou-
sand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00) on or before three 
months after the date of this Agreement, and the balance 
of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00) on or 
before six months from and after the date of this Agreement, 
with interest from the date of this Agreement until paid at 
the rate of five per cent (5%) per annum. This note shall 
be delivered to the SELLERS outside of escrow and is given to 
SELLERS as consideration for SELLERS entering into this Agree-
ment, but when said note is paid according to the tenor there-
of the BUYERS shall have credit for the principal sum thereof, 
to wit: $15,000.00, against the purchase price of the said real 
property, if the sale of said real property is consummated, at 
the time and in the manner herein set forth. If said purchase 
and sale is not so consummated because of a default on the 
part of the SELLERS, then said note shall be returned to the 
BUYERS, or if any money has been paid on said note the sum 
paid shall be refunded to the BUYERS j and if the SELLERS' 
default is wilful SELLERS will pay BUYERS the sum of $5,000.00 
as liquidated damages. If, however, the sale is not consum-
mated by reason of some default of the BUYERS, said note 
and/or the moneys received in payment thereof shall be 
retained and collected by the SELLERS as agreed consideration 
for entering into this Agreement. " 
[1] Defendants contend that under this provision the 
execution and payment of the note were separate considera-
tion for their entering into the agreement, and that since they 
) 
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did so, plaintiffs have received what they bargained for and 
are not entitled to restitution of any part of the payments. 
We cannot agree with this contention. Entering into an agree-
ment is meaningless except as rights and obligations flow 
therefrom, and we must therefore look to those rights and 
obligations to determine whether an initial payment is sup-
·ported by separate consideration. In the present case plain-
tiffs did not secure an option to purchase or not as they 
pleased; they entered into a mutually binding contract that 
could be specifically enforced against them, and they executed 
and paid the note in part performance of that contract. Under 
these circumstances the "mere recitation that the right of the 
seller to retain this deposit was in consideration for executing 
this agreement, is insufficient to establish meaningful separate 
consideration." (Rodriguez v. Barnett, 52 Ca1.2d 154, 160 
[338 P.2d 907] ; see also Estate of Williamson, 150 Cal.App.2d 
334, 336-337 [310 P.2d 77].) Nor does the evidence and find-
ing that the parties meant what they said by their recitation 
establish "meaningful separate consideration," for defend-
ants executed the agreement, not in exchange for the note 
and its payment alone, but in consideration of plaintiffs' 
agreement to purchase the property on all of the terms stated. 
[a] Since it is only because of plaintiffs' default in 
completing the purchase that defendants are given the right 
under the agreement to retain the payments made on the 
note, plaintiffs correctly contend that the provision giving 
that right is one "by which the amount of damage to be paid, 
or other compensation to be made, for a breach of an obliga-
tion, is determined in anticipation thereof." (Civ. Code, 
§ 1670.) It is therefore void unless it falls within the excep-
tion stated in Civil Code section 167V 
[3] In Freedman v. Rector, Wardens etc. of 8t. Matthias 
Parish, 37 Ca1.2d 16 [230 P.2d 629, 31 A.L.R.2d 1], we held 
that even a willfully defaulting vendee may recover the excess 
of his part payments over the damages caused by his breach. 
(See also Estate of Mesncr, 37 Ca1.2d 563, 567 [233 P.2d 551] ; 
Bi"d v. Kenworthy, 43 Ca1.2d 656, 659-660 [277 P.2d 1]; 
Estatc of Williamson, 150 Ca1.App.2d 334, 337 [310 P.2d 77] ; 
Pasteur Realty Corp. v. LaFleur, 154 Ca1.App.2d 5, 9 [315 
P.2d 374].) [4] We also pointed out that a provision for 
.. , The parties to a contract may agree therein upon an amount which 
shall be presumed to be the amount of damage sustained by a breach 
thereof, when, from the nature of the case, it would be impracticable 
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the retention of a reasonable down payment as liquidated 
damages in a contract for the sale of real property is pre-
sumptively valid. (37 Cal.2d at p. 23; see also Wright v. 
Rodgers, 198 Cal. 137, 142-143 [243 P. 866]; Civ. Code, 
§ 3387; 5 Corbin on Contracts, § 1133, pp. 602-603.) In 
the present case, however, defendants did not seek to sustain 
the provision for the retention of the note in the trial court on 
thE' theory that it was a provision for liquidated damages, and 
they have not advanced that theory on appeal. [6] Moreover, 
the evidence does not establish as a matter of law that the 
provision was one for liquidated damages. Although the labels 
adopted by the parties are not conclusive (Dyer Bros. Golden 
West Iron Works v. Oentral Iron Works, 182 Cal. 588, 592 
[189 P. 445] ; Smith v. Royal Mfg. Co., 185 Cal.App.2d 315, 
323 [8 Cal.Rptr. 417]; Folden v. Lobrovich, 171 Cal.App.2d 
627, 629 [341 P.2d 368] ; Hanlon Drydock etc. Co. v. G. W. 
McNear, Inc., 70 Cal.App. 204, 214 [232 P. 1002]; see 5 
Corbin on Contracts, § 1133, pp. 602-603), it is significant that 
the parties expressly provided for liquidated damages in the 
event of a breach by defendants but did not so describe the 
right to retain the note in the event of a breach by plaintift's. 
Nor did they provide that the retention and collection of the 
note should be the exclusive remedy in damages against plain-
tift's. (Of., Royer v. Oarter, 37 Cal.2d 544, 546-547 [233 P.2d 
539]; see Hetland, Oalifornia Land Contract, 48 Cal.L.Rev. 
729,744-745; 5 Corbin on Contracts, § 1061, p. 297.) [6] It 
is true that the amount of the note was less than 5 percent of 
the purchase price and that there was evidence that at the 
time the contract was made "it would be impracticable or 
extremely difficult to fix the actual damage." (Civ. Code, 
§ 1671; see McOarthy v. Tally,46 Cal.2d 577, 586 [297 P.2d 
981]; Ohastain v. Belmont, 43 Cal.2d 45, 58 [271 P.2d 498] ; 
Better Food Markets v. American Dist. Tel. 00., 40 Cal.2d 
179, 185 [253 P.2d 10, 42 A.L.R.2d 580].) There was other 
evidence, however, that the value of the land was expected 
to increase with the passage of time. It might be inferred 
therefrom that the parties did not contemplate that defend-
ants would suffer any damages if they were subsequently 
required to resell their property and that therefore the amount 
of the note did not represent a reasonable endeavor to estimate 
the probable damages in the event of plaintift's' breach. (See 
McOarthy v. Tally,46 Ca1.2d 577, 586 [297 P.2d 981] ; Rice v. 
Schmid, 18 Cal.2d 382, 386 [115 P.2d 498, 138 A.L.R. 589].) 
It thus appears that whether the parties intended the 
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provision for the retention of the note to be one for liquidated 
damages to the exclusion of the damages that would otherwise 
be recoverable and, if so, whether the requirements of Civil 
Code section 1671 were met, were questions of fact that it 
was incumbent on defendants to present to the trial court for 
resolution. Since they did not do so, the judgment cannot be 
reversed on the theory that the payment of the note consti-
tuted liquidated damages. (See Panopulos v. Maderis, 47 Cal. 
2d 337, 340-341 [303 P.2d 738J ; Ward v. Taggart, 51 Ca1.2d 
736, 742 [336 P.2d 534J ; Burdette v. Rolle/son Oonstruction 
00.,52 Ca1.2d 720, 725-726 [344 P.2d 307J.) 
[7] Plaintiffs appeal from the part of the judgment 
allowing defendants a deduction of $750 that defendants paid 
to a real estate broker in connection with the sale and from 
the part of the judgment denying interest from the date that 
the escrow was terminated. They contend that since defend-
ants resold the property without the assistance of a broker, 
they were saved the expense of a second broker's fee and that 
therefore they should not be allowed to deduct the broker's 
fee for the first sale from the amount paid by plaintiffs on the 
note. There is no merit in this contention, for defendants, not 
plaintiffs, are entitled to the benefit of any savings defendants 
effected by reselling their property without the assistance of a 
broker. (See Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Ca1.2d 36, 39-40 [216 P.2d 
13].) 
[8] Plaintiffs contend that their right to recover the 
excess of the payments over the damages suffered by defend-
ants became fixed when defendants terminated the escrow 
and that therefore they should recover interest on the excess 
from that date. Civil Code section 3287 provides that" Every 
person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable 
of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover 
which is vested in him upon a particular day, is entitled also 
to recover interest thereon from that day. . . ." Since the 
value of the property on which the extent of the damages 
depended (see Civ. Code, § 3307) was not certain and could 
not be made certain by calculation (Kingsbury v. Arcadia 
Unified School Dist., 43 Ca1.2d 33, 43-44 [271 P.2d 40]; 
Ooughlin v. Blair, 41 Ca1.2d 587, 604 [262 P.2d 305] ; Lineman 
v. Schmid, 32 Ca1.2d 204, 212-213 [195 P.2d 408, 4 A.L.R.2d 
1380]), interest did not become payable until the parties 
stipulated to that value on October 16, 1958. (Lineman v. 
Schmid, 32 Ca1.2d 204, 210 [195 P.2t1 408, 4 A.L.R.2d 1380] ; 
Gray v. Bekins, 186 Cal. 389,399 [199 P. 767].) Accordingly, 
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the trial court erred, not in failing to award interest from 
the date the escrow was closed, but in awarding it from the 
date the action was brought. 
The judgment is modified to provide that plaintiffs shall 
recover interest on the principal sum of $13,032.75 from 
October 16, 1958, instead of from January 24,1958. As so modi-
fied the judgment is affirmed. Each side shall bear its own 
costs on these appeals. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., con-
curred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-The contract involved in this 
litigation was freely entered into by competent parties who 
negotiated at arms length and plainly knew what they were 
doing and understood the terms of the agreement concerning 
the $15,000 promissory note, its payment, and the specification 
of the items of consideration to each. 
It is not a proper function of this court to remake the 
contract, amend it, or reevaluate the elements of consider-
ation to the respective parties. The $15,000 mentioned repre-
sented the consideration demanded by defendants and agreed 
to be paid (and actually paid, with interest) by plaintiffs 
for the very act of defendants' entering into an obligation 
which for a substantial period of time, among other things: 
(1) gave to plaintiffs a valuable right which they had not 
therefore possessed; (2) impaired defendants' title and their 
right freely to use or dispose of their land; and (3) only on 
the terms specified, including compensation for the detriment 
so suffered by defendants, further obligated them to sell and 
convey their land to plaintiffs. On the undisputed facts, both 
in law and in justice, defendants are entitled to retain the 
money paid as consideration for that detriment. The mere 
fact that mUltiple items and elements are aggregated in the 
contract to constitute consideration to the respective parties 
does not authorize the trial court or this court to disregard 
or strike down any of these items or elements as inconsequen-
tial to either party. 
Moreover, as conceded in the majority opinion (ante, p. 
519-520), even if we regard the contract as providing for liqui-
dated damages, it is presumptively valid and there is no 
showing of illegality. The amount of the note paid by plain-
tiffs and retained by defendants was less than 5 percent of 
the total purchase price and was negotiated in view of the 
length of the escrow. In addition to the hazard to defendants 
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of keeping the land off the market for six months, there was 
evidence that at the time the agreement was made the parties 
knew that the value of the land might be affected by current 
exploration for oil, the selection of a location for a contem-
plated freeway, and the general trend from agricultural to 
commercial and residential uses of land in the area. Thus, not 
. only was the amount to be retained by defendants shown to be 
-reasonable, but it is also established that "it would be imprac-
ticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage." (Civ. 
Code, § 1671.) The validity of a liquidated damage provision 
is, of course, to be determined as a matter of law in the light 
of the facts kno,\'n and unknown at the time the agreement 
was made. (McCarthy v. Tally (1956), 46 Ca1.2d 577, 586-
587 [10, 12] [297 P.2d 981] ; Chastain v. Belmont (1954),43 
Ca1.2d 45, 58 [10] [271 P.2d 498] ; Better Food Markets v. 
American Disi. Tel. Co. (1953),40 Ca1.2d 179, 185 [8] [253 
P .2d 10, 42 A.L.R.2d 580].) So tested, the agreement here is 
valid on any reasonable view of the facts. 
To require owners who receive a reasonable down payment 
pursuant to a valid contract to sell their land, to thereafter 
await the possibility of facing a court judgment that they 
refund the down payment upon the mere caprice of the buyer 
who changes his mind and breaches his contract-thus having 
extracted a valuable consideration but actually having given 
nothing of value in return-would seem also to mean that 
the down payment becomes of little value in the hands of 
sellers, who perforce must preserve it in the form of liquid 
money on pain of having other assets levied on and sold at 
execution on the judgment in favor of the defaulting buyer. 
This is plainly not justice, nor should it be the law; yet it 
appears but to accent a trend in decisional law. (See Freed-
man v. The Rector (1951), 37 Ca1.2d 16, 18-19, 22-23 [230 
P.2d 629, 31 A.L.R.2d 1] ; see also Jot'dan v. Talbot (1961), 
55 Ca1.2d 597, 611 [12 Ca1.Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20].) It 
would seem also that a further and more far reaching effect 
of the instant judgment may well be to encourage other 
persons to breach their obligations whenever it may appear 
profitable, convenient, or otherwise desirable to them so to do. 
I would reverse the judgment. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied September 
20, ]96]. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
